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FOOD FIRST DEVELOPMENT REPORT

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SOUTH AFRICA: A NEW U.S. POLICY FOR THE 1990s

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Kevin Danaher

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FOOD FIRST DEVELOPMENT REPORT SERIES

The Institute for Food and Development Policy, long known for its seminal work on international development, inaugurated this report series to offer lay people, specialists, academics, civic activists, and policymakers unique analyses of subjects of ongoing critical importance—internationally as well as nationally. The subjects in this series are as wide ranging as U.S. economic assistance, foreign policy, population, militarization, trade, and the environment. Each report will both pinpoint arguments central to current debate and recommend steps to generate positive action.

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SUMMARY

It is proper to wonder how South Africa can so confidently defy the civilized world. The conclusion is inescapable that it is less sure of its own power, but more sure that great nations will not sacrifice trade and profit to oppose them effectively. The shame of our nation is that it is objectively an ally of this monstrous Government in its grim war with its own black people.

—Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.

There have been many changes in the world since Martin Luther King, Jr., made that statement in 1965.¹

Unfortunately, U.S. policy toward South Africa has changed surprisingly little. Despite the sanctions legislation enacted in late 1986 — against the will of President Reagan — the United States remains the single most important protector of South Africa's apartheid regime. (While by 1988 Japan had become South Africa's top trading partner, the United States' position as the largest economy and the leading military and political power of the capitalist world gives it the most influence in the international struggle over apartheid.)

This report explains why this is so. By analyzing the historical relationship between the two countries, we lay a basis for proposing a new U.S. policy that would simultaneously strengthen the struggle against apartheid and advance U.S. interests throughout southern Africa. Understanding the potential for these two goals to be complementary — which they have *not* been in the past — requires an examination of the interest groups that have traditionally shaped U.S. policy toward South Africa.

The report gives a brief historical overview of U.S. policy. As

African states achieved independence and black Americans gained political rights, U.S. policymakers were forced into a “straddle” regarding apartheid: denouncing white minority rule while doing little to interfere with the support given to apartheid by major U.S. corporations and security agencies of the U.S. government.

Our analysis then focuses on the Reagan administration’s policy of “constructive engagement,” explaining how the policy subordinated African realities to a dogmatic emphasis on East-West competition. By comparing the Reagan team’s strategy, as laid bare in secret documents, with the changing realities of southern Africa, we can comprehend why the policy was not only spurned internationally but was rejected by the American people as well. The report also provides a theoretical framework for understanding why U.S. policy has been so contradictory—denouncing apartheid while blocking actions aimed at weakening apartheid. It exposes the weakness of relying on the nation-state as a key conceptual category and develops analytical tools for creating a new definition of the “national interest.”

We conclude with a detailed proposal for a new U.S. policy. By examining the many measures—economic, political, military—the United States could use to weaken apartheid and build U.S. ties to majority forces in South Africa and surrounding countries, the report constructs a viable alternative policy. But implementing these policy changes will require an antiapartheid movement capable of healing its many divisions and expanding its reach by convincing large numbers of Americans that they would benefit from democracy and development in South Africa. This must be part of a larger political movement challenging the U.S. elites who implement foreign policies that undermine our true national interests.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

During the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth century, U.S. policy toward South Africa could be described as “accumulationist”: safeguarding U.S. corporate access to South Africa’s human and natural resources in order to accumulate capital. With the United States’ rise to global prominence following World War II, these economic interests deepened and were supplemented by so-called national security interests. The CIA found South Africa’s intelligence apparatus a useful ally in the cold war; the U.S. Navy sought friendly ports of call; the Pentagon and arms manufacturers wanted secure access to strategic minerals used in making high-technology weapons.

Until the mid-1970s these corporate and state security interests prevented any serious consideration of sanctions to cut off the white minority regime. Two major factors kept sanctions off the political agenda: the stability of the white minority regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique; and the weakness of the U.S. antiapartheid movement.² Although movements opposed to white minority rule were developing steadily during the 1960s, it wasn’t until the 1974 collapse of Portuguese colonialism and the 1976 Soweto rebellion in South Africa that the Western alliance with white minority rule began to crack. Earlier incidents, such as the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, inflamed international protest but resulted in little more than official declarations against apartheid. But as the 1960s saw African nations gaining political independence and Afro-Americans achieving formal political equality, it became necessary for U.S. officials to criticize the racial aspect of South African injustice.

A U.S. policy straddle developed: while the verbal criticism of Pretoria’s violence was designed to placate critics of apartheid,

continued ties to white minority interests were designed to please corporate and national security interests. But as the gulf between South Africa and its opponents grew wider, U.S. policymakers had greater difficulty sounding credible in denouncing apartheid while consistently blocking international moves for sanctions. Washington's record of protecting Pretoria is most evident in the struggle for UN sanctions (particularly important because sanctions by this multilateral forum would be more effective than efforts by the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth, or individual states).¹ Both Republican and Democratic administrations have blocked or watered down efforts by the international community to isolate the apartheid regime, and key European allies such as England and West Germany have joined to consistently block UN sanctions. The most recent example was March 8, 1988 when the United States and Britain vetoed a Security Council proposal for an oil embargo against South Africa, despite a new South African government crackdown on opposition groups and a defiant speech by Pretoria's UN representative in which he said, "We reject your [UN] accusations with contempt and invite you to do your damndest."² By vetoing punitive measures aimed at Pretoria, Washington and its major allies angered many governments represented in the United Nations. Moreover, preventing sanctions has given Pretoria precious time to stockpile petroleum and develop its weapons industry—the two areas of greatest vulnerability.

The one case in which Washington is remembered as backing UN sanctions — the 1977 Security Council arms embargo — is generally misunderstood. So let us look at that case in some detail.

By the Carter administration's third month in office (March 1977) the Soweto rebellion of the previous year had once again caused many UN member states to propose Security Council sanctions. Ambassador Andrew Young succeeded in convincing the sponsoring nations to drop their proposed resolutions. But when South African police cracked down on the opposition in October 1977,

killing black consciousness leader Steve Biko in the process, the push for UN sanctions sprang to life again.

At this point, when Ambassador Young tried to persuade the African member states to drop the effort to isolate Pretoria, he was rebuffed. As Young noted, "For good reason the Africa group does not trust the West — any of us, not even me — because they sense a long heritage of betrayal."⁵

Security Council members Libya, Benin, and Mauritius submitted resolutions calling for a comprehensive arms embargo, an end to all nuclear collaboration, and economic sanctions limiting foreign investment and trade with South Africa.⁶ For the fourth time in UN history — each time over the issue of South Africa — Britain, France, and the United States exercised a triple veto.

The Western powers knew their actions would carry a high diplomatic cost, so they worked feverishly to hammer out a compromise resolution. The eventual compromise invoked Chapter Seven of the UN Charter (the section detailing the Security Council's authority to declare a nation "a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security," and therefore deserving sanctions) to institute a mandatory arms embargo. But the Western officials limited the precedent of the resolution by inserting wording to the effect that "the acquisition by South Africa of arms or related materials in the current situation" — not apartheid per se — was what constituted a threat to international peace.⁷

As if this diplomatic sleight of hand were not bad enough, five years after adoption of this mandatory arms embargo a U.S. House of Representatives report charged that "while there has been an official policy of embargoing arms to South Africa... the relevant U.S. government agencies have thus far failed to adopt procedures to effectively implement the embargo."⁸

After the liberal faction of the Carter administration lost control of foreign policy in 1978 to the hard-line faction led by National

Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. policy toward South Africa grew more conservative and eventually dovetailed into the most proapartheid policy yet — that of the Reagan administration.⁹

THE FAILURE OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT

The Reagan administration's policy toward southern Africa was an open book from the start. During the first few months, someone in the State Department leaked a series of confidential memos outlining the policy that would come to be known as constructive engagement.¹⁰ For some five years—until public pressure forced the White House to declare limited sanctions in late 1985—the Reagan team did not significantly waver from the strategy outlined in the leaked documents. The administration sought (1) reforms in apartheid—“US ability to develop full relations with SAG depends on success of Prime Minister Botha's [reform] program and extent to which it is seen as broadening SAG's domestic support”; and (2) “an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia”—preferably excluding SWAPO—in order to gain “greater acceptance of South Africa within the global framework of western security.”¹¹ It was hoped that these changes would “foreclose opportunities for growth of Soviet influence in southern Africa.”¹²

The Reagan strategists viewed the problem of South Africa as an inseparable part of regional developments in southern Africa. As early as 1981, the administration tried to link a democratic transition in Namibia to the removal of Cuban troops from Angola and the inclusion of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement in the Angolan government. Aware that linking a Namibia settlement to demands on Angola would provoke outrage in Africa, one secret U.S. policy memo advises lying about the linkage: “We would insist that these are unrelated, but in fact they would be mutually reinforcing, parallel tracks of an overall strategy.”¹³ For nearly two

years the administration denied that linkage was its idea, claiming that the insistence on a Cuban withdrawal was a legitimate demand from the security-conscious leaders in Pretoria. Finally, during congressional testimony on February 15, 1983, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker admitted that the linkage issue "was our effort. I am not denying that."¹⁴

Almost immediately after assuming office, the Reagan administration began planning covert operations against Angola in support of South Africa's destabilization efforts.¹⁵ The administration threatened that U.S. recognition of Angola was "out unless the Cubans leave and they [the Angolans] cut a deal with Savimbi. . . . if they won't play we have other options."¹⁶

By its third month in office (March 1981), the Reagan administration was pressing Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment which had prohibited U.S. aid to insurgents in Angola since its passage in June 1976. Soon after Congress repealed the Clark Amendment in August 1985, the administration admitted that it was supplying military aid to UNITA. The *New York Times* reported in February 1987 and again in July 1987 that the CIA and U.S. military personnel were shipping weapons to UNITA through the air base at Kamina, Zaire.¹⁷

Conceptual Blinders

A central defect of the administration's policy has been an obsession with East-West competition to the exclusion of North-South concerns. In one of the secret memos, Crocker stresses that the "top U.S. priority is to stop Soviet encroachment in Africa."¹⁸ In a memo to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Crocker advises Haig to assure South African leaders that "a Russian flag in Windhoek is as unacceptable to us as it is to you."¹⁹ The document states that the Reagan administration is "willing with them [the South African government] to open a new chapter in our relationship" based on the shared perception that "the chief threat to the

realization...of stability and cooperation in the region...is the presence and influence in the region of the Soviet Union and its allies."²⁰

As events have proven, the South African government, not Moscow, is the chief threat to stability and cooperation in southern Africa. The permissiveness of constructive engagement allowed Pretoria to create havoc throughout the region.²¹

The constructive engagement policy produced several results: Pretoria cracked down on its internal opposition and launched wide-ranging aggression against regional neighbors; African governments and black South Africans were alienated from Washington; and popular pressure in the United States resulted in legislation forcing the Reagan administration to implement a tougher stand against apartheid.

Why did constructive engagement fail so completely? First and foremost, President Reagan and his policymakers (having criticized the Carter administration for its "regionalitis," i.e. focusing too much on African realities and not enough on countering the Soviets²²) got so caught up in cold war dogma they were blind to the realities of southern Africa. Second, Chester Crocker, the administration's top Africanist and the main architect of constructive engagement, had limited knowledge of Africa. Crocker's written work focused almost exclusively on the white minority. For example, a seminal article, "South Africa: Strategy for Change" (*Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1980/1981), dealt almost exclusively with dynamics within the white population, relegating the black majority to little more than passing mention. This would soon prove to be a myopic view as antiapartheid protests took center stage. As William Minter noted, "Although Crocker was touted as an Africanist scholar, one can search his writings in vain for either sympathy with or detailed knowledge of any part of the continent save white South Africa."²³ Crocker and his Rhodesian wife also owned thousands of dollars of stock in South African gold mines—as revealed by his financial disclosure forms—and it is

tempting to speculate that this may have had some influence on his friendly attitude toward the South African status quo.

Notwithstanding his conservative bias, Crocker was attacked from the right during his confirmation hearings by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), a powerful member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Helms held up Crocker's appointment until August 1981 by subjecting him to months of anticommunist questioning. Once confirmed as assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Crocker answered to superiors such as Secretary of State Haig, National Security Advisor Richard Allen, and President Reagan—all to the right of Crocker on southern African issues. Most important of these, of course, was the president himself. Reagan had little to guide him other than his virulent anti-communism and a preference for people of his own skin color. As Chester Crocker confessed in an October 1980 interview, "All Reagan knows about southern Africa is that he's on the side of the whites."²⁴

Anticommunism was such a dominant force among Reagan's policymakers that even the administration's anxiety about South Africa's regional destabilization was based, not on a humanitarian concern for the suffering of African people, but on anti-Soviet fears. A secret State Department document states: "We cannot afford to give them [the South African government] a blank check regionally...SAG intransigence and violent adventures will expand Soviet opportunities and reduce Western leverage in Africa."²⁵

But this anticommunism is part true belief and part mere justification aimed at the American public. An objective assessment of Soviet influence in southern Africa shows that there is little chance of the USSR taking over the region.²⁶

Some U.S. policymakers acknowledge that the Soviet threat imagery is overblown. As one Reagan administration deputy assistant secretary of state admitted: "Southern Africa is, practi-

cally speaking, well outside the Soviet Union's zone of primary interest, indeed of its secondary interests. We believe that Moscow is aware of this fact and, in reality, spends little time thinking about the area."²⁷

Since Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power, Moscow itself has taken a "softer," more diplomatic line on the future of South Africa. "Soviet spokesmen speak of the desirability of long-term solutions in South Africa and of the importance of guaranteeing the rights of the white minority group, which is music to the ears of Pretoria."²⁸

Moreover, the cold war view that third world countries are little more than pawns in a superpower conflict angers many third world leaders. Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe — also head of the 100-nation Non-Aligned Movement — says bluntly: "Those who judge Africa in terms of East and West do us a grave disservice and they display deep ignorance."²⁹

Repeating Old Mistakes

Chester Crocker could have foreseen these problems. He did his formative work on Africa policy as an advisor to Henry Kissinger in Richard Nixon's White House, and the failure of constructive engagement closely resembles the failure of Kissinger's 1975–1976 intervention in Angola.³⁰

Washington's covert war in Angola came right after the humiliating defeat in Vietnam when Kissinger was desperate for ways to confront the Soviets.³¹ Against the recommendations of Africa specialists in the State Department, Kissinger ordered the CIA to collaborate with the South African military to prevent the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from coming to power in Angola. In the process, Kissinger created a policy disaster for Washington in southern Africa.

-
- Angola ended up with a left/nationalist government defended by the Soviet Union and Cuba.
 - U.S. prestige in Africa plummeted as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognized the MPLA government in Luanda, condemning intervention by the United States while choosing not to criticize the role of the USSR and Cuba.
 - The outcome showed Africans in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Namibia, and South Africa that black military forces with Soviet and Cuban aid could beat the combined forces of Washington and Pretoria. It is no mere coincidence that the Soweto rebellion followed close on the heels of the successful independence struggles in Mozambique and Angola. A close reading of political developments inside South Africa at this time shows that many young activists were enheartened by the victories in the former Portuguese colonies.
 - South Africa's minister of defence, P. W. Botha, was angered by U.S. betrayal when Washington encouraged the South African invasion of Angola and later turned its back as Pretoria's troops bogged down under punishing artillery fire from Cuban/Angolan forces.
 - White House credibility was dealt a serious blow when it became known that administration officials had lied about the Angola intervention to Congress and the American public.

Yet Crocker and others failed to learn an important lesson from the Angola fiasco: Pretoria was a liability, not an asset, for U.S. policy in the region. It was South Africa's role that united African governments in denouncing U.S. intervention while supporting Cuban and Soviet intervention.

Misjudging Pretoria

The Reagan administration, tied to its policy of constructive engagement, failed to understand that a viable policy for the future required consent from the majority, not just "stability" and meager concessions from the minority. The elites who have controlled South Africa and allied themselves with Western rulers are not capable of leading a transition to democracy. The South African government is militarily strong and therefore some Western policymakers see Pretoria as an important ally. But Pretoria's strength is negative. It has the power to destroy but it does not have the power to build. Pretoria cannot stabilize the region, it can only destabilize the region. The social forces that will play a dominant role in shaping the future of South Africa are African workers and peasants — the very groups that are alienated from the white minority regime and its Western backers such as the Reagan administration.

The Reaganites' anti-Soviet line made it difficult for them to calm the hard-liners in South Africa's top policymaking body, the State Security Council (SSC). SSC hawks really believe that there is a Kremlin-directed "total onslaught." The Reagan administration's East-West emphasis allowed Pretoria to shift responsibility for conflict in the region to the two superpowers, thus disguising its own culpability.

The Reagan administration's strident rhetoric against terrorism gave a green light to Pretoria for launching assaults on neighboring countries accused of harboring African National Congress (ANC) "terrorists." During the first month of the Reagan administration — within days of Secretary of State Haig making a speech denouncing "rampant international terrorism" — Pretoria mounted its biggest attack on Mozambique to date and justified it as an assault on "terrorist bases" of the ANC.¹² On many occasions Pretoria would claim that its attacks on neighbors were the same as U.S. action against international terrorism.

The hawkish South African policymakers reason that African sentiment for majority rule cannot be appeased with minor reforms and therefore Pretoria should bully its own majority and its neighbors into acceptance of continued South African domination of the region.¹⁴ The SSC—dominated by military officers¹⁴—and State President P. W. Botha, himself minister of defence for fourteen years prior to assuming the top government post in 1978, know that the government's strong suit is repression, not legitimacy, so they will stick to that strong suit.¹⁵

Furthermore, Crocker may have underestimated the distrust lingering in the minds of people like P. W. Botha due to the 1976 betrayal in Angola at the hands of a Republican administration (Gerald Ford) in Washington. *The Economist's* South Africa correspondent underlined the importance of this bitter memory: "South African soldiers bang the table and remark that they will never again take mere promises from Washington. What Mr. Crocker optimistically calls mere differences in 'the timing and modalities' of a settlement [in Namibia] are fundamental differences of interest and trust."¹⁶

These various shortcomings of constructive engagement were then catalyzed by its ultimate weakness: its failure to develop support for the policy among the American people. As *The Economist* concluded, Crocker "had plainly not established his own declared precondition for constructive engagement: a domestic consensus to end the 'policy oscillations which have done little to engender respect for America's sense of purpose.'" ¹⁷

After seven years of constructive engagement the policy had failed to achieve any of its stated goals. South Africa was less democratic and embroiled in more social conflict than when Reagan took office. Security and economic development in the region had deteriorated, largely due to South African aggression. Namibia had not achieved independence, and the MPLA still ruled Angola with Cuban assistance.

The policy of constructive engagement did "succeed" in one sense.

It gave Pretoria time to make the changes it deemed necessary to consolidate its grip on power. The Reagan administration gave Pretoria valuable time by fending off international pressure for sanctions with claims that it was negotiating quietly for significant changes. The apartheid regime used this breathing space to hit its neighbors with a broad array of economic and military pressures and modernize the system of control within South Africa. But those members of the Reagan administration who may privately view these developments as a success for their policies, reflect a misunderstanding of what is going on in southern Africa. Pretoria's increased repression can only preserve the status quo *temporarily*, and the same U.S. policies that gave a breathing space to Pretoria also helped create a backlash of international opposition to apartheid and U.S. policy in the region.

The Antiapartheid Movement Wins a Battle

The U.S. antiapartheid movement which seemed to burst on the scene in late 1984 had been developing for decades. As early as 1937, black singer and activist Paul Robeson formed the Council on African Affairs, which became an outspoken critic of U.S. ties to South Africa.¹⁸ Since 1953, the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) has educated Americans about apartheid and mobilized support for sanctions. In 1972, ACOA was instrumental in establishing the Washington Office on Africa which directly lobbies Congress for antiapartheid legislation. In 1976, the Congressional Black Caucus launched TransAfrica, a black American lobby for Africa and the Caribbean. These groups—and others such as the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility and the American Friends Service Committee—have traditionally exercised only minor influence on U.S. national legislation. Yet they deserve credit for the decades of painstaking public education that laid a foundation for the outburst of popular pressure that produced sanctions legislation in 1986.¹⁹

Not surprisingly, surges in the level of activity of the U.S. anti-

apartheid movement have been directly related to the intensity of conflict in South Africa, with a slight lag time. For example, a burst of activity followed the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. Following the 1976 Soweto rebellion, U.S. activism came to a peak in 1977-1978 and then subsided until six years later when increased activism in South Africa again elicited a similar jump in U.S. grassroots activism.

The growing number of black Americans who were reaching positions of influence in government, academia, and the corporate world further buttressed the antiapartheid movement. Though difficult to quantify, the impact of people such as Jesse Jackson, Randall Robinson, Franklin Thomas, Donald McHenry, Mary Frances Berry, Judge William Booth, Mark Stepp, Rep. William Gray, professor Willard Johnson, and Franklin Williams helped white leaders to understand the severity of South Africa's human rights abuses.⁴⁰

The 1986 sanctions legislation notwithstanding, the movement has been more successful overall at the local level. One reason for the antiapartheid movement's lack of impact on national legislation was positive: many activists were focusing their energies on the investment portfolios of local institutions such as colleges, trade unions, churches, and local governments. The divestment movement brought the issue of South Africa home to many U.S. communities by demanding that public monies not be invested in U.S. corporations profiting from apartheid.

By late 1985, these actions had resulted in the withdrawal of nearly \$4.5 billion in public funds from corporations doing business in South Africa. Between 1977 and 1987, some 135 U.S. colleges and universities restructured their investment portfolios, selling stock of companies operating in South Africa.

In the debate over the legality of divestment, prodivestment forces won a major battle in mid-July 1987 when Circuit Court Judge Martin Greenfeld upheld Baltimore's divestment law, ruling that

TABLE 1: U.S. Direct Investment in South Africa, 1982-1986
(Year-end Position in Billions of Dollars)

Year	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Value	2.3	2.0	1.5	1.2	1.1

SOURCE: William H. Cooper, "Sanctions Against South Africa: Impact on the United States," Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief # IB87198, 3 September 1987, 4.

it was within the city council's power to require the city's pension fund to sell South Africa—related stock. The judge rejected claims by opponents of the law that it would lead to financial losses and that it violated federal jurisdiction over foreign policy. The judge ruled that even if there were costs, they "would be insubstantial when compared to the salutary moral principle which generated the ordinance."⁴¹ By mid-1987, twenty-one states, fourteen counties, and more than seventy cities—including New York, Los Angeles, Washington, San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Chicago—passed some form of divestment law.⁴²

The combination of political pressure at home and a stagnating economy in South Africa produced a steady decline in U.S. direct investment (see table 1). By late 1987, 143 U.S. companies had announced some type of divestment from South Africa.⁴¹

Despite these major achievements at the local level, the anti-apartheid movement did not receive attention from the mass media until late 1984 and 1985 when a number of factors converged to produce a groundswell of anti-apartheid activity in the United States. In late 1984, South Africa was erupting in protest, with a major work stoppage in the Vaal Triangle and large demonstrations against the government's proposal for a new constitution that would exclude the black majority from sharing political power. In October, Bishop Desmond Tutu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, drawing media attention to an articulate anti-apartheid voice. With the reelection of Ronald Reagan, the

dismal prospect of four more years of constructive engagement caused U.S. activists to think more boldly.

Beginning in November, the newly formed Free South Africa Movement caught the media's attention by organizing daily protests at the South African Embassy in Washington.⁴⁴

These acts of nonviolent civil disobedience attracted a number of well-known politicians, clergy, trade unionists, and celebrities.⁴⁵ The resulting publicity helped educate millions of Americans about apartheid and strengthened opposition to South Africa's policies.⁴⁶ Increased media attention—both to the upsurge in South Africa and the spread of antiapartheid activity in the United States—played a crucial role in shifting national sentiment to a position more critical of continued U.S. ties to Pretoria.

Half-Hearted Sanctions

The growing protest movement bolstered congressional support for sanctions. During the 1985 legislative session, numerous proposals for reducing U.S. corporate and government ties to Pretoria were introduced in the House and Senate. The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 passed the House of Representatives (295–127) on June 5, 1985. It called for banning new U.S. investment and nuclear collaboration, prohibiting bank loans and computer sales to the South African government, and stopping the importation of Krugerrands. By September, sanctions legislation was gaining momentum in the Republican-controlled Senate. The Reagan administration faced the likelihood of having to veto sanctions legislation that could probably muster the two-thirds majority needed to override a presidential veto. President Reagan headed off Senate action by issuing an executive order imposing mild sanctions against South Africa. The extraordinary nature of this move is exemplified by the second paragraph of the executive order: "I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, find that the policies and actions of the Government of

South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat." The executive order banned most transfers of nuclear technology, prohibited sales of Krugerrands in the United States, banned sale of U.S. computers to South African government agencies which enforce apartheid, banned loans to the South African government unless they were for projects which would benefit all races, and limited export assistance to U.S. companies not abiding by fair employment principles. Although the measures were designed to have as little real impact as possible, they were a psychological blow to the South African government which had grown accustomed to a steady diet of carrots from the Reagan administration.

This ploy failed to placate antiapartheid forces, and in 1986, a new, stronger piece of legislation made its way through Congress. On October 2, 1986, the death knell of constructive engagement was sounded when the Senate voted 78–21 to join the House in overriding President Reagan's veto and the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 became law.

The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) embodies competing interests and is contradictory. It establishes some policies which may weaken the apartheid state but it also contains provisions clearly designed to prevent leftist elements of the popular resistance from gaining influence.

The stated purpose of the CAAA is to set out a "framework to guide the efforts of the United States in helping to bring an end to apartheid in South Africa and lead to the establishment of a nonracial, democratic form of government."⁴⁷ The United States would use the measures set forth in the CAAA to encourage Pretoria to

- repeal the state of emergency and respect the principle of equal justice for all

-
- release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners
 - permit the free exercise of political expression
 - set a timetable for elimination of apartheid laws
 - negotiate with representatives of all racial groups
 - end aggression against neighboring states

The sanctions provisions of the CAAA call for

- prohibiting air transport between the two countries by either South African or U.S. airlines
- prohibiting nuclear trade
- banning U.S. banks from taking deposits from any agency of the South African government
- blocking the importation of South African coal, iron and steel, agricultural and edible products, textiles, and uranium⁴⁸
- prohibiting new U.S. investment in South Africa, except in firms owned by black South Africans
- terminating tax agreements between the two countries which had fostered business ties by preventing double taxation
- stopping the U.S. government from purchasing any goods from any agency of the South African government
- banning the sale to South Africa of U.S. petroleum products and any goods on the United States Munitions List

Section 501(a) states that "it shall be the policy of the United States to impose additional measures against the Government of

South Africa if substantial progress has not been made within twelve months” of the CAAA’s enactment.

Title II of the CAAA provides for U.S. economic assistance to South Africans. This comes in various forms: scholarships for South Africans to study in the United States and in South Africa; legal and other assistance to political prisoners and their families; aid to business enterprises that are more than 50 percent black owned; a suggested code of conduct (similar to the Sullivan Principles) for U.S. companies to use when employing South Africans; and assistance to families of victims of “necklacing” (burning an opponent in a gasoline-soaked tire).

The CAAA makes various recommendations on how the executive branch should conduct U.S. policy, many of which the Reagan administration has failed to follow.⁴⁹ For example, Section 401(e) expresses the sense of Congress that the president should instruct the United States’ ambassador to the UN to propose Security Council sanctions similar to those in the CAAA. But when such sanctions were proposed by other Security Council members in February 1987, the Reagan administration (along with Britain and West Germany) vetoed them.⁵⁰

The U.S. Congress’ contradictory attitudes on South Africa are revealed in its ambivalence regarding the liberation movement. Section 102 of the CAAA calls for the African National Congress (ANC) to “suspend terrorist activities” as a prelude to negotiations with Pretoria, declare support for a “free and democratic post-apartheid South Africa,” and “reexamine their ties to the South African Communist Party.” The CAAA contains references to “cross-border terrorism”—imputing equal status to South Africa’s regional destabilization and the ANC’s guerrilla war. Another section warns ominously that “some of the organizations fighting apartheid have become infiltrated by Communists.” These statements reflect ignorance in Washington about the ANC and its importance to any likely transition to democracy in South Africa.

Formed in 1912, the ANC is the oldest and most respected liberation movement on the African continent. The organization has been deeply influenced by African nationalism and Christian pacifism, as well as by socialist ideology.⁵¹ This helps explain the ANC's tendency toward political moderation and nonviolence. The ANC was strictly nonviolent for half a century until the Sharpeville massacre and brutal government repression in the early 1960s forced leaders to conclude that nonviolent struggle was not producing results.

When the ANC sought military assistance, it received help from African states and the Soviet Union, not from the NATO countries. In the course of waging armed struggle, the ANC has focused on "hard targets" (economic infrastructure, police and military installations) rather than "soft targets" such as white civilians. A CIA report in the mid-1980s concluded that the ANC "could have inflicted a large number of white casualties if it had chosen to do so."⁵²

Conservatives have tried to sully the image of the African National Congress by alleging it is controlled by the South African Communist party and is thus a tool of the Kremlin. But as top U.S. officials have increasingly met with the ANC and as more sophisticated analyses of the ANC have appeared in influential journals,⁵³ this portrayal becomes more difficult.

Whatever one thinks about the ANC's ideology or conduct, U.S. policymakers must confront a simple fact: the ANC has broad popular support and no democratic transition will take place in South Africa without the ANC's participation.

Most members of Congress seek a difficult goal: they would like to see apartheid eliminated without destroying capitalism. But as an abundant literature shows, apartheid is not simply a racist coating that can be peeled away from a democratic, capitalist core; apartheid and capitalism developed together in organic unity.⁵⁴

This is not to say that capitalism cannot survive in South Africa without apartheid. As we have seen in many countries, capitalism is very resilient and survives as a world economy that is not dependent on political changes in any particular country. But South Africa is distinct in that inequality is obvious because owners and workers are different colors and many procapitalist forces outside South Africa express support for the struggle against apartheid, even though that struggle is led by organizations highly critical of capitalism.

This also highlights a fundamental dispute over the definition of democracy. Most U.S. policymakers would be satisfied if South Africa implemented an electoral system allowing representation for every adult voter, regardless of race or ethnicity. But millions of South Africans are demanding that the transition to democratic rule include a redistribution of control over property as well as an expansion of formal political rights. For example, in July 1987, COSATU, South Africa's largest trade union federation, embraced the ANC's Freedom Charter which calls for basic restructuring of the economy in a socialist direction. The socialist content of the South African freedom struggle may prove to be a growing difficulty for U.S. policymakers. In addition to the formal positions of key groups such as the ANC, the United Democratic Front, and COSATU, there is evidence that general attitudes among South African blacks are growing more anticapitalist. Polling by David Hirschman found that "there was broad agreement that opposition to the capitalist economic system was on the increase."⁵⁵

Going into greater historical detail would only prove the same point: U.S. policymakers have struggled to preserve ties between the U.S. elite and the South African elite.⁵⁶ While the empirical data proving this point is abundant, the theoretical literature on U.S. policy in southern Africa is practically nonexistent.⁵⁷ The following section attempts to partially fill this conceptual gap.

SHARPENING OUR ANALYTICAL TOOLS

Most analyses of international relations use the nation-state as the key conceptual category.⁵⁸ We hear statements such as: "The USA has billions of dollars invested in South Africa"; "South Africa will (or will not) be hurt by sanctions." But this language disguises more than it reveals. It is not the United States *as a nation* that owns property in South Africa. And sanctions against South Africa will have different effects on different sectors of that society.

A more accurate analysis is possible by noting the specific linkages that bind the two countries: a transnational alliance of elites, mainly top business and government leaders on both sides. This alliance is *de facto*, not formal. The two ruling elites are linked not by a single document spelling out an explicit alliance but by an agglomeration of trade deals, military accords, intelligence sharing, investments, loans, technology transfers, conferences, training seminars, secret briefings, personal friendships, and even marriages. Although these various ties may involve billions of dollars and decide the fate of millions of people, they are conducted by a relatively small group of mainly older, rich, white males, representing a tiny percentage of each national population.

The class content of the alliance is determined by more than economic status; it is also conditioned by people's preferences for different types of social systems. This definition of class allies is concerned with people's class *stance*—their political beliefs and behavior, as well as by their class background—their level of wealth and power in the social hierarchy. If a black South African worker believes that capitalism is the best of all possible worlds, then that worker will tolerate conditions that may cause other workers to rebel against the system. Conversely, history is full of

people born into wealth who became convinced of capitalism's built-in injustice and worked to change the very social structures that gave them their privilege.

Thus the elite alliance is not limited to the rich. It includes people of lesser means whose political behavior helps preserve, with minor changes, the existing system of class rule. The conservative black vigilantes in South Africa are not wealthy, but they are part of the elite transnational alliance because their negative impact on the antiapartheid movement helps maintain the current structure of inequality.⁹⁹ Opposing them are progressive South Africans of many classes — workers, professionals, small farmers — and their foreign supporters, seeking to establish a new political system. This adherence to different visions of which classes should rule a society is a key defining characteristic of a transnational class alliance.

Taking this perspective, the nation-state is broken down into the kinds of relations existing between certain sectors of the U.S. population and certain sectors in South Africa. Under this formula, sanctions and disinvestment are not interruptions in relations between two *countries*, but interruptions in relations among specific classes, individuals, and institutions such as corporations and government agencies.

It is possible for links between one set of transnational allies to be dissolving while links between another set are being built. The antiapartheid movement is disrupting ties between powerful U.S. interests (corporations, banks, the CIA, the Pentagon) and their South African counterparts, while building ties between the American people and South African grassroots groups such as trade unions, church groups, development organizations, and the liberation movement.

From this standpoint, common media statements such as "U.S. ties to South Africa are deteriorating" are simply inaccurate. During the 1980s, many U.S. students, trade unionists, and other

antiapartheid forces have *strengthened* their ties to their South African counterparts. Only corporate and government ties have been deteriorating.

A key flaw in mainstream arguments is that they judge the effectiveness of sanctions solely by the reactions of the South African government. But to judge the effectiveness of sanctions, it is necessary to look at their impact on different parts of the population. Some conservative whites may indeed react to sanctions by hardening their resistance to change, but other whites react by becoming more open to change. Opposition forces in South Africa say they gain strength from antiapartheid struggles in other countries.

Popular forces have embraced an important insight: the central objective of political struggle is "unite friends, divide enemies." Issues such as divestment and sanctions should not be judged ultimately by whether they create unemployment in South Africa or hurt the South African economy. They should be judged politically, by the extent to which they drive a wedge between South Africa's rulers and their supporters in the outside world. A white minority of 15 percent cannot rule for long without powerful external allies.

An example of how international pressure can forge new alliances can be seen in the political realignments in South Africa vis-à-vis the ANC. Immediately after an August 1985 cutoff of new foreign loans caused a financial panic in South Africa, many white businesspeople began denouncing apartheid and talking to the ANC.

When a group of fifty prominent Afrikaners went to Senegal in July 1987 for talks with the ANC, *The Economist* commented: "With each visit by South African notables for talks with the African National Congress, negotiations between the ANC and the white government become a little more imaginable."⁶⁰ The same article notes that "a survey by Mr. Deon Geldenhuys, a

professor at Rand Afrikaans University, showed that about 40% of whites want the government to negotiate with it [the ANC].” A similar sentiment prevails regarding the liberation movement in Namibia. “Between 1982 and late 1985, the proportion of whites who wanted the Namibian war settled by direct talks with SWAPO grew from about a third to more than half.”⁶¹

Monolithic white resistance to power sharing has been broken down by a combination of demographic changes, pressure against the regime, and the opposition’s embrace of whites willing to consider democratic alternatives. As the Afrikaner community has evolved from a relatively homogeneous group of mostly small farmers to a stratified group with many class divisions, significant political differences have developed.⁶² Whereas Afrikaner workers and farmers have tended to become more resistant to negotiation with the black majority, many Afrikaner businessmen and intellectuals know that they cannot withstand global ostracism indefinitely. It is no mere coincidence that the escalation of international pressure in 1985 was followed by great dissension in white ranks.

Comparative Evidence

Another way to demonstrate the importance of transnational elite alliances is to examine the evidence on U.S. sanctions against other countries. These examples show that although Pretoria is guilty of greater human rights abuses and worse violations of international law than other targets of U.S. sanctions (e.g., Syria, Libya, Nicaragua, Cuba, PDR Yemen), Washington more readily punishes these nations because there are not strong ties between U.S. elites and the elites in these countries.⁶³

The case of U.S. sanctions against Idi Amin’s Uganda in 1978 provides another example. Heinous as Amin’s government was, it could not compare to South Africa’s in terms of aggression against neighboring countries or the sheer number of people brutalized.

Yet major U.S. corporate interests in Uganda amounted to little more than a few coffee companies and the Pentagon had no major stake in keeping Amin in office. Thus it was relatively easy for Congress to mobilize the will to impose economic sanctions against Uganda and encourage other governments to do the same. Tanzanian Ambassador to the United States Paul Bomani admitted that following Ugandan aggression in October 1978, "the US boycott was a definite factor in our counterattack" which eventually forced Amin from Uganda in March 1979.⁶⁴

More recently, the Reagan administration eliminated U.S. aid to the government of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe for offenses far less serious than the crimes of Pretoria. In September 1983, Zimbabwe abstained on a U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council resolution condemning the Soviet Union for the downing of a Korean airliner. In October Zimbabwe cosponsored a UN resolution condemning the U.S. invasion of Grenada. The Reagan administration retaliated by cutting U.S. aid to Zimbabwe for FY1984 from \$75 million to \$40 million. Then in 1985, a Zimbabwean official criticized U.S. policy during July Fourth celebrations in Harare. Among the diplomats in attendance was former president Jimmy Carter who was offended by the remarks and walked out in protest. The Reagan administration used this minor incident as justification for terminating U.S. aid to Zimbabwe.

These cases show that the primary factor determining sanctions is not the objective behavior of the target state but how much U.S. policymakers believe the foreign elite serves U.S. interests. If there are only weak ties between the U.S. elite and the rulers of another country, U.S. policymakers will find it easier to impose sanctions on that country.

Building New Alliances

Efforts to build up new allies reveal a serious problem. The Reagan administration, prodded by Congress, sought to cultivate conser-

vative black forces in South Africa through assistance programs run by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID).⁶⁵ Although U.S. economic aid to South Africa soared from a mere \$40,000 in 1981 to \$25 million in 1987, groups likely to play an important role in South Africa's future are largely excluded from the process. Some, like the ANC, are shunned by U.S. policymakers because they are deemed too radical. Others, such as the United Democratic Front—the largest legal opposition group—refuse to accept U.S. government money because they consider these funds politically tainted. Some of the African groups willing to take U.S. money, such as Inkatha and its trade union affiliate UWUSA, are as much a liability as an asset to U.S. policy in South Africa: Inkatha's collaboration with the government, its extortion of money from black citizens, and its violent attacks on antiapartheid organizations have earned it many enemies.⁶⁶

As in many third world countries, U.S. policymakers face a difficult contradiction. In order to gain access to the resources of a country and have influence, Washington needs local collaborators. But often the very act of collaborating with Washington undermines an essential ingredient of local leadership—legitimacy among the people. Those who are most likely to cooperate with U.S. policy are often lacking in popular support, and those with broad popular support are often the ones most critical of U.S. policy. This is because in many countries U.S. policy has a long tradition of supporting unpopular, antidemocratic elites. Hence groups enjoying the most popularity are often those opposed to both the local government and Washington.

When a regime allied to Washington is threatened with mass insurrection, U.S. policymakers confront the problem of how to resist or control a transition to a new form of rule. In revolutionary situations (e.g., Cuba, Vietnam, Iran, Nicaragua) where an entire regime is run out of the country, the typical U.S. response is to implement sanctions and try to strangle the new regime before it can consolidate itself. In situations of rebellion short of revolution (e.g., Duvalier in Haiti, Marcos in the Philippines) the strategy

is to remove the hated dictator and assist sections of the business class and the military to keep the lid on further change.

Can the latter strategy work in South Africa? Current U.S. aid programs can buy the gratitude of a few thousand individuals and a handful of organizations. But some of these will suffer public ostracism for the mere fact of benefiting from U.S. largesse while U.S. policy remains the largest international prop for the racist status quo.

The current dilemma for U.S. policymakers with regard to South Africa was foreshadowed in the other white minority-ruled states of the region. While nationalist opposition forces in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe were gaining strength during the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. policymakers downplayed the importance of these groups. A few years prior to the overthrow of Portuguese colonialism, Kissinger's infamous National Security Study Memorandum no. 39 claimed "the whites are here to stay" and "there is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence."⁶⁷ By the time the radical insurgencies in these countries reached the regime-threatening proportions needed to gain official U.S. attention, their societies had become deeply polarized and were not amenable to U.S. solutions.

These lessons from neighboring countries have not been absorbed by U.S. policymakers. After many decades of abetting Pretoria's racists, the U.S. government is having a difficult time waking up to the fact that it needs to develop new allies in southern Africa.

If allowed to continue on its present course, U.S. policy will probably remain hamstrung and ineffective. Popular opposition to apartheid will remain high enough to prevent saving a procapitalist regime, while U.S. policymakers' fears about the socialist content of South Africa's opposition movement will prevent U.S. policy from embracing the most dynamic forces in South African society. Washington's policy will appear wishy-washy and of two minds, caught as it is between the lingering interests of the CIA, Penta-

gon, and powerful corporations on the one hand, and growing international opposition to apartheid on the other.

The chain of cause and effect outlined above can be seen clearly during the 1980s. Intensified struggle inside South Africa forced many Western government agencies and corporations to pull back from South Africa. At the same time, popular alliances across borders were being strengthened.

These changes translate into pressure on the policymakers. Note that it was during the Reagan administration — the U.S. administration more friendly to Pretoria than any other in recent memory — that U.S. sanctions advanced further than ever before. Reagan's permissive policies strengthened the hard-liners in South Africa's militarized government, allowing them to strike out viciously against their foes. While crushing many opponents of apartheid, this conservative violence also fanned the flames of international protest. The escalating outrage against apartheid created popular pressure in the United States strong enough to force a reluctant President Reagan to impose punitive measures against Pretoria.

A POLICY FOR THE FUTURE

To put the discussion of a new policy into its broadest human context, we must pose one simple question: would there be such hesitation to pressure Pretoria if the racial proportions in southern Africa were reversed? If a black minority of 15 percent ruled despotically over a white South African majority, would we have heard decades of debate over the alleged ineffectiveness of sanctions? If a black minority regime were savaging white neighboring countries and shooting white South African children dead in the streets, how many days would it take for Western gunboats to appear off the coast of South Africa?

This is not to say that racism is the only factor explaining U.S. reluctance to act against white minority rule. The main factors shaping U.S. policy toward South Africa can be summarized as follows: (1) the U.S. position as number one global power in the postwar period meant that Washington developed foreign allies who would welcome U.S. business and cooperate with U.S. military objectives; (2) the sectors of U.S. society with the most influence over foreign policy (large transnational corporations and national security agencies such as the Pentagon and the CIA) developed close ties to elites around the world, including the white minority regimes of southern Africa; and (3) these questionable alliances have required a rationale to make the policy acceptable to the U.S. public, hence the exaggerated fear of communism and the many arguments for continued ties to white minority rule in South Africa.⁶⁸

With the gradual discrediting of racism, defenders of U.S. ties to Pretoria have been forced to abandon openly racist arguments and rely more on anticommunist and antiterrorist themes.

Support for Pretoria is sometimes justified by the alleged com-

munism of the African National Congress. As with other areas of U.S. foreign policy, the rationale for supporting antidemocratic regimes is that a possible communist future is worse than the actual dictatorial present. This hypothesis fails a basic test of logic because it cannot be tested both ways.

The implicit assumption is that we Westerners know what is best for these third worlders, and we won't let them run their own societies and make their own mistakes. This thinking is as essentially racist as the colonial rationale of the white man's burden. It is a world view that presumes that third world people are so docile that even though their children are starving, they will not rebel unless a white man from Moscow incites them. Then there is the equally absurd notion that if the poor rebel successfully, they will immediately hand their country over to the Soviets. Considering the limitations of Soviet foreign aid, this assumes great stupidity on the part of third world leaders.

The cold war world view sees Africans, Asians, and Latins as ignorant of their own self-interest, suited only for manipulation by outside powers. Independence is not an option in this zero-sum game; one can only choose between domination by the United States or the USSR. This view is not only racist, it is inaccurate. The key development in third world politics over the past three decades has been the Non-Aligned Movement. Some 100 countries, of various political and economic persuasions, resent being forced to choose between two camps.

New Conditions Require a New Policy

Even many conservatives in the West now admit that Pretoria's strategy of minor reform coupled with vigorous repression cannot provide a lasting solution. Secretary of State Shultz's own Advisory Committee rejected the constructive engagement view, noting that "the slow, halting, circumscribed nature of the reforms so far enacted by Pretoria has largely discredited the argument that

fundamental change can be brought about through a process managed and led by a National Party government." The committee, consisting of top leaders from business and government, broke with past U.S. policy by calling for tougher sanctions against Pretoria. The committee's final report of February 10, 1987 recommends a concerted international effort to impose economic sanctions and isolate South Africa.⁶⁹

This support for stronger *tactics* should not lead us to assume that U.S. elites have changed their long-term goals in southern Africa. Washington policymakers retain the strategic objective of keeping South Africa nonsocialist and within the Western sphere of influence, but they are gradually realizing that the white minority regime is not the best partner for achieving these goals. The Shultz committee report epitomizes this more sophisticated logic.

South Africa's position aside the sea-lanes around the Cape of Good Hope is frequently used as an argument in favor of South Africa's military importance, but the apparent consensus among U.S. defense planners is that these sea-lanes are under minimal threat and that the active collaboration of the South African government would not significantly increase our ability to protect them. It is important for our long-term strategic interests that South Africa not fall under the control of a government hostile to the United States or one allied with the USSR that might allow the establishment of a Soviet military presence.⁷⁰

This tactical change has been helped by the steady withdrawal from South Africa of many major corporations. With less of a financial stake in the survival of apartheid, it has become easier for influential Americans to accept—or at least, not actively oppose—sanctions against South Africa.

The various parts of the opposition movement in South Africa (the ANC, churches, trade unions, community groups) have survived fierce repression and have gained new legitimacy in the

international arena. Antiapartheid forces in the West have pushed the debate on sanctions to a level not imagined possible just a few years ago.

Conditions are ripe for a new U.S. policy. But making a transition from a policy of siding with a minority regime to a new policy based on active support for majority aspirations will require deep rethinking by U.S. leaders. This rethinking can only be guaranteed by pressure from the grassroots, which will be the product of education and organizing.

Outline of a New Policy

A new U.S. policy toward South Africa should have two immediate objectives: (1) helping strengthen links between workers and peasants in South Africa and their allies in the outside world; and (2) weakening the international alliance of proapartheid forces by breaking links between South African elites and their international supporters. This strategy of uniting friends while dividing enemies holds the greatest promise for assisting democracy and development in South Africa without imposing specific "solutions" concocted by U.S. policymakers.

The strongest U.S. foreign policy instrument would be a president committed to restructuring U.S. relations with South Africa. While many U.S. presidents have *talked* tough against apartheid, South African leaders have never faced a U.S. leader who promised and delivered tough material pressure.⁷¹ Under such a policy, the president would announce to all South Africans a schedule of U.S. measures, steadily increasing in severity, which would be implemented if the South African government failed to make certain basic changes toward democracy. (See chapter 7 for a detailed list of measures.)

The desired changes by Pretoria would include the following: (1)

end state violence by police and military personnel; (2) provide emergency assistance to those starving, especially in the bantustans and white rural areas where malnutrition rates are extremely high;⁷² (3) end aggression against neighboring states; (4) repeal the state of emergency and respect the principle of equal justice for all; (5) release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners; (6) permit the free exercise of political expression; (7) set a timetable for elimination of apartheid laws; and (8) negotiate with representatives of opposition political forces.

In order to push Pretoria toward these changes, Washington would employ several categories of pressure.

- **Make economic sanctions truly comprehensive.** South Africa has a relatively open economy: "foreign trade as a proportion of GDP averaged 54 percent from 1981–1985."⁷³ Even the limited sanctions passed to date have had a telling effect. U.S. Commerce Department data shows that in the first six months of 1987 South African exports to the United States declined 45 percent.⁷⁴ Existing U.S. sanctions should be extended to prohibit all trade except the importation of South African goods which can be shown to be essential to the U.S. economy.⁷⁵ Current law allows certain short-term credits such as trade financing.⁷⁶ These should be prohibited due to the importance of indirect investment to the South African economy.⁷⁷ A punitive measure that could come later in the schedule would be the seizure of South African assets in the United States.
- **Seek collaboration on international sanctions.** The single most important act would be for the United States to fully support comprehensive, mandatory sanctions by the United Nations Security Council. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 called on the president or secretary of state to "convene an international conference of other industrialized democracies in order to reach cooperative agreements to impose sanctions." But the Reagan administration did not fulfill this provision. They also failed to comply with the CAAA's provision calling

for further penalties in twelve months if Pretoria failed to respond favorably to the 1986 sanctions.

The NATO countries play a crucial role in providing capital, technology, and export markets. It is essential for U.S. leaders to work at convincing South Africa's main trading partners to reduce ties to South Africa that bolster the existing structure of power. Israel would be sensitive to U.S. pressure to lessen its economic and military support for Pretoria.⁷⁸ Japan is now South Africa's top trading partner and the Japanese government is keen to stay on good terms with Washington in order to retain access to the lucrative U.S. market. South African allies such as South Korea and Taiwan are also susceptible to Washington's influence.

- **Take steps to weaken the South African Defence Force (SADF).** The main prop of white power is South Africa's security apparatus. As long as whites feel they are strong militarily, they will not make political concessions significant enough to bring the opposition to the bargaining table.

Cutting Pretoria off from its remaining ties to NATO military forces would not be a great loss to the West. Many Western powers have already reduced their military and intelligence ties.⁷⁹ The Dellums/Cranston legislation would prohibit any U.S. agency from collaborating with the South African military and would bar U.S. intelligence agencies from any direct or indirect cooperation with the South African government. This would further weaken a force facing long-term technical and manpower difficulties.

A new U.S. policy would have the further advantage of encouraging defections from the South African military by both black and white troops, but especially among whites because the white regime cannot depend too heavily on black troops.⁸⁰ A growing number of young whites are already resisting conscription into the SADF. In August 1987, for example, a group of

twenty-three young whites announced that they would refuse military service. Their statement read, in part: "We believe that the SADF is not a shield behind which peaceful change can occur, but an instrument for defending the privileges of a minority. The SADF continually contravenes international law."⁸¹

Beset by recruitment problems, Pretoria's generals could be dealt a stiff blow by such international efforts to drain their manpower pool. Both Washington and local governments in the United States could offer various kinds of asylum and assistance to South African war resisters.

- **Plan for an eventual naval blockade of South Africa's main ports.** This would be a multilateral effort, preferably under United Nations' auspices. The blockade could be limited to petroleum products and weaponry or could include all imports other than food and medicine; it could also block bulk exports such as coal and farm products. While this measure may seem drastic, we must keep in mind the massive destruction being done by the South African government internally and in the region. We should also recall our earlier question: if it were white children dying at the hands of a black minority government, would there be such aversion to a naval blockade?

A Vortex of Violence?

The history of white minority regimes in southern Africa shows that in each case there has been a group of conservative whites who believe their military prowess is sufficient to hold off the inevitable transition to majority rule. More reasonable minds realize that repression can *postpone* but not *prevent* a transition to majority rule. A central question becomes how to minimize the havoc created by the more die-hard conservatives who would rather fight a civil war than share power.

A relatively nonviolent transition to democracy in South Africa will only be possible if the major powers exert pressure on Pretoria to compromise. This would minimize the need for the liberation movement to rely on force of arms. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu has said, sanctions are the only alternative to violent change. "We ask our friends to apply economic pressure. . . . Our last chance for peaceful change lies in the international community applying political, diplomatic and especially economic pressure."⁸²

Contrary to conservative predictions, sanctions are likely to *limit* violence, not increase it. As the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group (EPG) reasoned, "the South African government is concerned about the adoption of effective economic measures against it. If it comes to the conclusion that it would always remain protected from such measures, the process of change in South Africa is unlikely to increase in momentum and the descent into violence would be accelerated."⁸³ The EPG predicted that sanctions would have a positive impact on the opposition as well. "[If black leaders] believe that the world community will never exercise sufficient effective pressure through other measures in support of their cause, they will have only one option remaining: that of ever-increasing violence."⁸⁴

The white state has relied on violence because coercion, rather than mass legitimacy, is its strong suit. Only when significant numbers of the white elite see better prospects in a nonmilitary arena will they change their current course of using violence to hold off compromise on big questions such as democratic elections.⁸⁵

A firm commitment to a set of escalating pressures from the United States and its allies would alter the policy framework of Pretoria by making the alternatives to a negotiated transition more unpleasant. The schedule of escalating pressures on white rule would be balanced by a sincere offer of U.S. good offices to help negotiate a transfer of power to a majority government. Pressure on Pretoria

would also be supplemented by efforts to fortify neighboring countries.

Strengthening South Africa's Neighbors

A new U.S. policy would greatly increase economic assistance to southern Africa. South African aggression has caused billions of dollars worth of destruction to neighboring countries and only major infusions of capital from the industrial nations can make up for these losses.⁸⁶ A good conduit for such assistance would be the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which since 1980 has implemented a broad range of projects with two central goals: to coordinate regional development among its nine member nations and to reduce dependence on South Africa.⁸⁷ Much more aid from Washington should go to areas given high priority by the SADCC, especially transport, communications, and food security.

We must stress, however, that a change in the *quantity* of assistance is not enough. The region also needs a different *quality* of aid. As we document in our book *Betraying the National Interest*, most U.S. aid is based on a trickle-down approach that puts money into the hands of people at the top of the social structure.⁸⁸ This may buy influence with a recipient country's politicians, businessmen, and military leaders but it does little to foster development at the base of the society. Putting money into the hands of the powerful usually operates against the interests of the powerless.

Aid should be thoroughly restructured to focus on facilitating the empowerment of the poor majority. One of the primary objectives of this new aid would be to foster regional cooperation, not just among governments, but among mass organizations as well. Washington could help prepare for a postapartheid South Africa by focusing aid on private grassroots organizations, and by facilitating contact between the region's church groups, trade unions, farmers' organizations, and student groups. Conferences and other educa-

tional forums could be sponsored to prepare for a postapartheid situation in which smaller states would not be dominated by the more powerful economy of South Africa.⁸⁹

In addition to providing scholarships for students to study in the United States, Washington could fund student exchanges within southern Africa. A conference of international educators found that "a full year of higher education could be provided to a South African student at the University of Zambia for \$1,100 as compared with \$11,000 for an equivalent period in the U.S."⁹⁰

A new U.S. policy would be based on extensive consultation with SADCC countries, especially the five Frontline States—Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania—which are pledged to assist the liberation struggles in South Africa and Namibia. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 recommends that the president discuss with South Africa's neighbors the effects of sanctions-related disruptions, but the Reagan administration has not followed this recommendation.

Consultation would produce more realistic ways to aid SADCC countries and put pressure on Pretoria. More generally, it would be a new *modus operandi* for the U.S. government to consult with smaller states instead of imposing its will on them.

The SADCC states can provide important development lessons. Even under the strain of South Africa's destabilization campaign, SADCC has made important advances and proven itself to be one of the most successful regional development groups in the world. Also, if the SADCC countries are stable and prosperous, they can allay the fears of conservative South Africans who equate majority rule with "destroying South Africa" or "pushing whites into the sea."

Essential for fostering development in the region is preventing South African aggression. It makes little sense to fund economic development projects only to have South African-sponsored ter-

rorists destroy them. Washington could make it clear to Pretoria that any regional attacks would be met with strong punitive action such as a naval blockade. The United States could also pressure countries such as Morocco and Saudi Arabia which have provided assistance to the South African-supported terrorist movements destabilizing Mozambique and Angola. These actions could be bolstered by material aid to the liberation movements and the Frontline States. Washington could also push for the stationing of United Nations troops in vulnerable areas of the Frontline States, particularly along the rail corridors in Angola and Mozambique currently shut down by sabotage.

The schedule of increasingly punitive measures against Pretoria and the new aid to SADCC states would be complementary. By increasing the pressure on apartheid while strengthening alternative models of development in the region, the United States would help convince white constituencies in South Africa that their future could be made more secure by negotiation than by relying on force.

Building Public Support

It is easy to make a list of measures that could be implemented by an enlightened government, but only an enlightened and active citizenry can guarantee enlightened government. Thus the central question is how can we educate and mobilize broad public support for progressive U.S. policies in southern Africa?

A forward-thinking president could play an important role in educating the American people and cultivating popular support for new policies. But as the passage of the 1986 sanctions law over President Reagan's veto demonstrated, if popular pressure is strong enough, the people can change U.S. policy even with an unsympathetic president in the White House.

Focusing the antiapartheid movement's energy solely on national

legislation — passing new federal laws through lobbying — cannot guarantee that the government will obey its own laws. For example, by having the government of Saudi Arabia provide funds to UNITA, the Reagan administration circumvented the 1976 Clark Amendment prohibiting U.S. aid to rebels in Angola.⁹¹ And, as pointed out in this report, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 has been implemented halfheartedly by the Reagan administration.⁹² Only popular education, mobilization and constant monitoring of policymakers can ensure that legislation will be carried out as intended.

A major problem confronting the U.S. antiapartheid movement is the lack of coordination — and sometimes overt hostility — among different sections of the movement. While there is general agreement that success for progressive policies requires both grassroots mobilization and lobbying in Washington, in practice there is often friction between people specializing in each of these tactics. Those committed to one particular set of tactics will often argue that their work is objectively more important, rather than seeing themselves as one part of a larger division of labor. This error is understandable given that the antiapartheid movement is a shifting coalition of small groups, not a unified organization with a shared strategy. Until the movement forges greater unity both within the United States and with allies abroad progressive forces will be unable to force a thorough restructuring of U.S. policy.

Progressive forces from southern Africa can play an important role in this quest for unity. By reminding Americans that the many people dying every day in southern Africa do not have time to wait for lengthy U.S. squabbles, southern Africans could enhearten Americans to get organized.

The U.S. public provides fertile ground for antiapartheid organizing. A large majority of Americans are opposed to apartheid and would like to see it ended. A 1986 poll found that 57 percent of the public favor sanctions designed to pressure the South African government to alter its system of apartheid.⁹³ Where consensus

breaks down is on the specific tactics the U.S. government should use. "Presented with alternatives on sanctions the public divided three ways: one-third favored no action, one-third favored limited economic sanctions... and one-third favored stringent economic sanctions."⁹⁴ A major obstacle to educating the public will be the anticommunist ideology that has replaced explicitly racist thinking as a justification for backing Pretoria and opposing liberation movements. This vague fear of communism inhibits U.S. public opposition to apartheid. A 1987 poll asked Americans whether a communist government being *elected* in South Africa would be a threat to the United States: 21 percent said it would be a "great threat" and 40 percent said it would be "somewhat of a threat."⁹⁵

Failure to support the liberation movement reflects the passive nature of the American public's opposition to apartheid. Only a small percentage of the public is directly involved in efforts to isolate the apartheid regime. It is black Americans, the churches, trade unions, and activist organizations who hold the key to whether U.S. citizens will mobilize to actively oppose apartheid.

The U.S. news media and national political parties played a role in the passage of existing sanctions legislation. But these institutions are dominated by white, wealthy interests, not likely to champion the cause of the poor. And Pretoria can restrict the flow of information, as it has done to great effect in recent years. So the responsibility for constructing a progressive policy ultimately depends on a more unified grassroots campaign capable of educating broad sectors of the public and pressuring the policymakers.

CONCLUSION

Changing U.S. policy in southern Africa is part of a much larger project to reshape the role of the United States in the world. We are now making a difficult transition from a nation that just decades ago dominated the world to being just one powerful country among many. As part of this transition, we will need to restructure the policies and institutions that are revealing themselves to be detrimental to the interests of most Americans.

A foreign policy for the future must seek to be a majority policy: strengthening U.S. ties to workers and peasants, not the generals, politicians, and big businessmen who are now the main beneficiaries of U.S. policy. Abandoning a foreign policy that hitches the U.S. star to elite groups around the world will require a domestic restructuring of the Pentagon, the CIA, transnational corporations and other powerful institutions that have locked us into a foreign policy that favors minority rule.

The progressive movement in the United States must convince large numbers of Americans that current foreign policy and the leaders implementing it are not representing the true national interests of the United States.⁹⁶ The history of U.S. policy toward South Africa shows that friendly ties with the white minority regime were not in the best interests of most Americans, yet these supportive relations persisted because of the interests of a small minority running major corporations, the Pentagon, and other government agencies. This elite control of U.S. foreign policy becomes a greater liability to U.S. national interests as the United States steadily declines from its position as the number one global power.

The movement must go beyond the moral repugnance of apartheid. Moral outrage will always be the core of public opposition

to apartheid, but this can be supplemented by showing how putting an end to white minority rule in South Africa would be in the self-interest of most Americans, including most corporations. If South Africa were democratic and experiencing balanced economic development there would be more South African consumers able to buy U.S. exports. The end of apartheid would allow U.S. corporations to invest in South Africa without the stigma currently associated with these investments. A postapartheid South Africa would need large infusions of capital to develop education, health facilities, housing, agricultural inputs, and much more, and this would provide many opportunities for U.S. investors. As South African wages rose — a likely result of democratization — there would also be fewer U.S. workers losing their jobs due to U.S. companies running away to take advantage of low wages in South Africa.

By focusing on truly national U.S. interests, the antiapartheid movement can show that the South Africa issue provides opportunities to (1) educate Americans about racism and help them see how phobias about communism do not produce good foreign policy; (2) ensure a brighter future for our reputation in the world; and (3) help unlock the vast potential of South Africa and neighboring countries, benefiting the U.S. economy in the process.

Among those already active in antiapartheid work there is a growing realization that the issue goes beyond apartheid to the greater democratization of American life. For example, groups opposing bank loans to South Africa have linked this issue to the bank practice of redlining: refusing to issue loans to poor sections of U.S. cities.⁹⁷ College students and faculty have linked the issue of apartheid with the struggle against various forms of institutional racism in academia. Trade unionists have used the issue of South Africa to educate U.S. workers about their relationship to international struggles. Those advocating divestment point out that divestment is not just about South Africa. More fundamentally it is about average Americans demanding a say in how capital will

be invested. The divestment movement challenges a central tenet of capitalism: investment decisions are best handled undemocratically by the wealthy minority that owns most of the capital.

In the struggle at Harvard University to get antiapartheid alumni elected to the Board of Overseers (a body of alumni whose powers are second only to those of the Harvard Corporation), organizers saw that the issue went beyond removing Harvard investments from corporations doing business in South Africa. Progressive forces say they would like to see the board act in a socially responsible way on issues such as CIA and defense-related research, lack of women and minorities on the faculty, and Harvard's role as an urban landlord.⁹⁸

This pressure for greater democratization can be seen in other areas such as the movement to convert military production to peaceful uses and workers' demands for more control over pension funds. These efforts, as well as divestment, are part of a larger movement that poses the question: Why shouldn't we expand our democratic traditions to the economic realm? Another way to view this movement for a broader definition of democracy is that it seeks to redefine U.S. national interests to truly represent majority needs and aspirations.

The task of creating widespread support for a progressive policy in southern Africa seems daunting. But we should remember that as recently as 1984 very few people would have predicted that in just two years we would have sanctions legislation under Ronald Reagan, the most proapartheid president in history.

We must continually remind ourselves that the implementation of progressive policies rests on the political consciousness and mobilization of a broad-based popular movement and that movement is nothing more than millions of people like you and me. As two Nobel Peace Prize winners, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Chief Albert Luthuli, said in a joint statement in 1962:

Let us recognize that each of us, of whatever race, from whatever nation, makes apartheid possible as long as we fail to take action against it.⁹⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is particularly important for progressive forces to not only critique traditional policies but to spell out alternatives. Candidates for public office need to be shown that policy options exist that would simultaneously benefit the poor majority abroad while better serving U.S. national interests. The following list of possible actions is only as good as the people who will use it as a tool to change U.S. policy.

The schedule of pressures on Pretoria would include economic, diplomatic, and military measures. The president would announce the following measures and the general time frame in which they would be introduced. This would bolster antiapartheid forces while letting the apartheid regime and its supporters know what is confronting them if apartheid is not dismantled. If significant reforms were implemented by Pretoria, the president could halt implementation of additional measures and rescind existing ones.

It would *not* be assumed that these measures alone could bring down apartheid and replace it with a democratic system. But these measures, in concert with pressure from U.S. allies, would weaken the supporters of apartheid while fortifying the opposition.

The following list is grouped into three general categories: immediate measures to be implemented during the early months of the policy; intermediate measures to be phased in if Pretoria continued resisting pressure for reform; and ultimate measures to be used if the South African government proved intransigent. The precise timing of measures within each category would be decided by the president in consultation with cabinet officers and congressional leaders. This list begins with measures that would cause the least disruption for U.S. citizens, thus allowing time for educating the public about the need for the tougher measures to come.

Initial Measures

- Lobby for comprehensive, mandatory sanctions at the United Nations. Invoke Chapter Seven of the UN Charter to argue that the very existence of apartheid is a threat to world peace. To overcome conservative objections that a permanent sanctions resolution would give the USSR veto power over rescinding the measure if South Africa reformed, the United States could propose a temporary sanctions resolution that would need to be reaffirmed periodically by the Security Council.
- Send high-level delegations (governmental and private) to the SADCC countries to assess development needs and possible joint action in resisting South African pressure.
- Through speeches, media appearances, and government publications, educate the U.S. public about South Africa's repression of its own people and its attacks on neighboring countries.
- Increase official attention to political detainees in South Africa. If South African dissidents received as much publicity as those in the Soviet Union, the U.S. public would be far more likely to support stronger action against apartheid.
- Increase funding for legal aid to political activists on trial in South Africa.
- Expand research on the various alternatives to importing South African minerals: conservation, recycling, stockpiling, developing substitute materials, expanding U.S. production, and finding alternative source countries.
- Encourage all countries to strictly abide by the UN arms embargo against South Africa.
- End all support for UNITA in Angola and establish normal

relations with the government of Angola.

- Join the United Nations Council on Namibia.
- Push for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 which contains guidelines for a transfer to a democratically elected government in Namibia.
- Make it absolutely clear that NATO protection does not extend to South Africa and that under no circumstances would the U.S. military be used to protect a regime practicing apartheid.
- Set up high-visibility White House meetings with leaders of the liberation movements (ANC and SWAPO) and leaders of the Frontline States.
- End traditional denunciation of the use of force by the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia. This would bring U.S. policy in line with the South African Council of Churches which acknowledges the legitimacy of the use of force as a component of ending apartheid.
- Close offices in the United States run by UNITA and the Mozambique National Resistance. Deny visas to members of these organizations.
- Make U.S. visa policy as restrictive against South Africa as their visa policy is against Americans. Retaliate immediately when U.S. citizens are denied South African visas for political reasons. Facilitate visas and political asylum for victims of apartheid.
- Offer political asylum in the United States to young South Africans who resist military service.
- Encourage U.S. entertainers and athletes to support the cultural boycott of South Africa.

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- Channel most U.S. aid to southern Africa through SADCC in order to strengthen regional development efforts.
 - Encourage other industrial countries to join the United States in establishing a special fund to offset SADCC losses due to South African aggression.
 - Prohibit any U.S. nuclear collaboration (private or public) with South Africa.
 - Press for South Africa's full compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
 - End all intelligence cooperation between the United States and South Africa.
 - Make large financial commitments to the UN Trust Fund for South Africa, which provides legal aid and humanitarian assistance to oppressed South Africans. Also contribute to the UN Educational Program and Training for Southern Africans.
 - Ratify the UN International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, which recognizes apartheid as a crime against humanity.
 - Terminate all cooperative agreements between U.S. government agencies and South African agencies.
 - Expand the definition of U.S. Munitions List products to prohibit the sale of all U.S. goods to the South African police and military.
 - Have U.S. Embassy personnel attend South African political trials in order to publicize them to the outside world and to lend moral support to the accused.
 - Increase scholarship funding for black South Africans to study

in the United States and especially in neighboring states of southern Africa.

- Increase funding for regional meetings of private grassroots organizations in southern Africa so they can better coordinate strategies of democratic development.
- Provide assistance to private U.S. groups doing solidarity work and development projects in southern Africa. Much could be learned from the aid programs of the Scandinavian countries. For example, the Swedish government pays transport costs to southern Africa for clothing collected from the Swedish people by private groups.
- Encourage private voluntary organizations to expand their activities in southern Africa in cooperation with grassroots groups from the region. Encourage lawyers, doctors, teachers, and other professional groups to extend assistance to their southern African counterparts.
- Provide humanitarian assistance to the African National Congress and SWAPO.
- Announce that the United States will never recognize the homeland governments created by Pretoria, and that we will also take punitive actions against governments that do recognize or invest in these apartheid ministates.
- Prohibit U.S. companies in South Africa from reinvesting earnings in that economy. Advise U.S. firms choosing to stay in South Africa that they do so at their own risk and will not receive special consideration if nationalized by a postapartheid government.
- Encourage U.S. companies remaining in South Africa to negotiate with trade unions, especially on the issue of disinvestment. COSATU, the leading trade union confederation, has

called for foreign firms to pull out, but they want this done in consultation with the workers. Demands by our government on U.S. corporations can be backed up with the threat of making noncomplying firms ineligible for U.S. government contracts.

- Steadily remove U.S. commercial and other attachés from South Africa and reduce the number of South African embassy officials allowed in the United States.

Intermediate Measures

- Support multilateral efforts to enforce the UN Council on Namibia's Decree no. 1 outlawing the removal of Namibian minerals and other resources without the consent of the United Nations.
- Prohibit all forms of lending— including trade credits — to public and private entities in South Africa.
- Prohibit U.S. banks from holding accounts of any South African government agencies or state-owned corporations.
- In cooperation with the major industrial countries, take measures to drive down the price of gold, thus hitting South Africa's main earner of foreign exchange. This measure is superior to many other economic sanctions in that it could have a sharp impact on South Africa's minority government, while imposing less hardship on oppressed South Africans and citizens of the industrial countries.¹⁰⁰
- Restrict tourism to South Africa. Washington has used this tactic in other cases as a way of diminishing foreign exchange earnings for the target country.¹⁰¹ The majority of foreign visitors to South Africa (54.5 percent) are tourists, mainly from Western countries, and restrictions on tourism would have considerable impact.¹⁰²

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- Extend U.S. economic sanctions by prohibiting all trade except for the importation of South African strategic minerals which can be shown to be essential for U.S. industry.
 - Use U.S. influence with major oil-producing states and U.S. oil companies to cut off South Africa's supply of petroleum and refined products.
 - Make U.S. intelligence data available to countries trying to impose trade sanctions against South Africa.

Ultimate Measures

- Seize South African assets in the United States and encourage other governments to do likewise.
- Sponsor a UN Security Council resolution to encourage military assistance to SADCC countries and the liberation movements.
- Sponsor a UN Security Council resolution calling for an international naval blockade of South African ports.

NOTES

1. From a speech by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. at Hunter College, New York City, on Human Rights Day, 10 Dec. 1965, reproduced in the *Congressional Record—House*, 5 June 1985, H 3822.
2. For a longer discussion of these historical points see Kevin Danaher, *The Political Economy of U.S. Policy Toward South Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), chapter 2.
3. The most comprehensive study of economic sanctions shows that two ingredients crucial to their success are the relative size of the sender to the target (larger is better) and coordination of sender countries. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1985).
4. "U.S. and Britain Veto a UN Move to Impose Penalties on Pretoria," *New York Times*, 9 March 1988, p. 2. For the historical record see Camille Bratton, "A Matter of Record: The History of the United States Voting Pattern in the United Nations Regarding Racism, Colonialism and Apartheid 1946–1976," *Freedomways* 17, no. 3, 1977; United Nations, *Resolutions Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council on the Question of Apartheid, 1960–1980* (New York: UN, 1981); Clyde Ferguson, "The United States, the United Nations and the Struggle Against Racial Apartheid," in Natalie Kaufman Hevener, ed., *The Dynamics of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981).
5. *Department of State Bulletin*, 5 Dec. 1977, 792, (transcript of ABC's "Issues and Answers," 30 Oct. 1977).
6. For the texts of the proposed resolutions see United Nations documents S/12310/Rev. 1, S/12311/Rev. 1, and S.12312/Rev. 1. For the resolution that eventually passed see *Department of State Bulletin*, 12 Dec. 1977.
7. See "Arms Ban 'Loopholes' Criticized," *Washington Post*, 29 Oct. 1977.
8. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Enforcement of the United States Arms Embargo Against South Africa* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982).
9. See Danaher, *Political Economy*, chapter 5, "The Carter Administra-

tion, 1977–1981,” especially pp. 173–175.

10. For the full texts of these documents, see *TransAfrica News Report*, Special Edition, August 1981; and Leslie Gelb, “U.S. Seeks Angola Compromise as Price for Accord on Namibia,” *New York Times*, 1 June 1981, p. 1. The documents included a briefing paper on U.S.–South Africa relations written by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker to prepare Secretary of State Alexander Haig for a 14 May 1981 meeting with South African Foreign Minister Roelof “Pik” Botha; a summary of an April 1981 meeting in Pretoria between Crocker, Botha, and South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan; and a short paper detailing South Africa’s request for resumption of enriched uranium shipments from the United States (the Carter administration had halted uranium shipments in 1977).

11. *TransAfrica News Report*, Special Edition, Aug. 1981.

12. *Ibid*

13. “U.S. Seeks Angola Compromise.”

14. *Washington Notes on Africa*, Winter 1983, 2. Also see Joseph Lelyveld, “Namibia and the Cubans in Angola: U.S. Linkage Pleases South Africa,” *New York Times*, 15 July 1982.

15. For reference to documents which foreshadowed the 1986–1987 Iran-contra revelations, see the two articles by Jack Anderson, “CIA Said to Plan New Links with Anticommunists,” *Washington Post*, 26 Aug. 1981, and “CIA Gearing Up for Operations with Foreigners,” *Washington Post*, 27 Aug. 1981. The 26 Aug. article quotes a top-secret planning document written by CIA Director William Casey saying that increased covert support to antigovernment forces “is a critical need...especially in Angola.”

Former CIA officer John Stockwell alleges that the Reagan administration broke the law in its quest to “fight communism” in southern Africa. “Now in the early 1980’s, the North-Secord group were diverting aid and getting other countries to aid Savimbi. They were violating the Clark Amendment.” *Ties That Bind*, Jan.–Feb. 1988, 3.

In 1987, it was revealed that the government of Saudi Arabia had been channeling funds to anticommunist rebel groups favored by the Reagan administration. Testifying under oath to a congressional subcommittee, California businessman Sam Joseph Bamieh said that since 1981 “he acted as a go-between for the royal family and several figures in the Reagan

administration" in financing UNITA and anticommunist rebel groups in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Sudan, Somalia, and other countries. Neil A. Lewis, "Saudis Linked to Donations to Angola," *New York Times*, 2 July 1987.

16. "U.S. Seeks Angola Compromise."

17. James Brooke, "C.I.A. Said to Send Rebels in Angola Weapons via Zaire," *New York Times*, 1 Feb. 1987; and James Brooke, "U.S. Arms Airlift to Angola Rebels Is Said to Go On," *New York Times*, 27 July 1987.

18. *TransAfrica News*.

19. *TransAfrica News*.

20. *TransAfrica News*.

21. For a brief overview see Kevin Danaher, "Hunger as a Weapon: South Africa's War Against Its Neighbors," Institute for Food and Development Policy, *Action Alert*, 1986. For greater detail see Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa* (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986); and Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, eds., *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986).

22. "Reagan Aides Diagnose 'Regionalitis' in U.S. Africa Policy," *New York Times*, 7 Dec. 1980.

23. William Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 312.

24. Interview conducted by the author, Oct. 1980, Washington, D.C.

25. *TransAfrica News*.

26. See Kevin Danaher, *In Whose Interest? A Guide to US-South Africa Relations* (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1984), chapter 4.

27. Frank Wisner, quoted in Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, *South Africa Without Apartheid: Dismantling Racial Discrimination* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 120.

28. "South Africa: Pretoria looks ahead," *Africa Confidential* 28, no. 25 (16 Dec. 1987), 2.

29. Robert G. Mugabe, "Struggle for Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*,

Winter 1987/1988, 322.

30. See Danaher, *Political Economy*, 112–120.

31. For a detailed analysis of Kissinger's intervention in Angola by the man who led the CIA task force in that operation, see John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1978).

32. Minter, 313.

33. See Simon Jenkins, "America and South Africa: Antiapartheid without tears," *The Economist*, 30 Mar. 1985.

34. See Danaher, *In Whose Interest*, 27–30.

35. See "South Africa: The security line-up," *Africa Confidential*, 10 June 1987; and Kenneth W. Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986).

36. Jenkins, 21.

37. Jenkins, 28.

38. A sample from a 1952 council editorial shows why the group was hounded out of existence by the U.S. government:

It is clear that in raising our voice against the Malan regime we simultaneously strike a blow at reactionary forces in our own land who seek to preserve here, in South Africa, and everywhere else the super profits they harvest from racial and national oppression.

Quoted in Patrick Henry Martin, "American Values on South Africa, 1948–1972" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1974), 112.

39. The two best sources of information on the U.S. antiapartheid movement are the American Committee on Africa, 198 Broadway, New York, NY 10038, and the Washington Office on Africa, 110 Maryland Ave., NE, Washington, DC 20002. For background on the antiapartheid movement see Brooke Baldwin and Theodore Brown, *Economic Action Against Apartheid: An Overview of the Divestment Campaign and Financial Implications for Institutional Investors* (New York: The Africa Fund, 1985); David Mermelstein, ed., *The Antiapartheid Reader* (New York: Grove Press, 1987); Alfred O. Hero, Jr., and John Barratt, *The American People and South Africa* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1981); and "U.S. Pressures For Sanctions," in S. Prakash Sethi, ed., *The South African Quagmire* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987).

40. For a more detailed discussion of this point see Richard J. Payne, "Black Americans and the Demise of Constructive Engagement," *Africa Today* 33, nos. 2/3 (1986).

41. "A Court Backs Divestment," *Business Week*, 10 Aug. 1987, 34. For pro and con sides in the legal debate over divestment laws see Jennifer Davis, James Cason, and Gail Hovey, "Economic Disengagement and South Africa: The Effectiveness and Feasibility of Implementing Sanctions and Divestment," and John H. Chettle, "The Law and Policy of Divestment of South African Stock," both in *Law and Policy in International Business* 15, no. 2 (1983).

42. Merle Lipton, *Sanctions and South Africa: The Dynamics of Economic Isolation* (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988), 156-159.

43. "Guarding the Credit of Pretoria," *Financial Times*, 14 Dec. 1987. Most of these U.S. companies did not completely withdraw from South Africa. They either sold their operations to South African firms, or restructured their operations in ways that reduced their direct involvement but maintained their access to the South African market. See Lipton, *Sanctions and South Africa*, 65.

44. For a discussion of the causes of the Free South Africa Movement's explosion onto the scene, see *Washington Notes on Africa*, Winter/Spring 1985.

45. For a list of prominent demonstrators who were arrested at the South African Embassy see Payne.

46. For polling data on the Free South Africa Movement's impact on public opinion, see Barry Sussman, "South Africa Sanctions: The Shaping of Public Opinion," *Washington Post*, 29 July 1985, p. 37, National Weekly Edition.

47. All quotes, unless otherwise noted, are from Public Law 99-440, the *Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986*, 2 Oct. 1986.

48. Some members of Congress, especially Sen. Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, had sought the exemption of South African uranium that is enriched in the United States and then reexported. But on 2 July 1987 the U.S. Commerce Department announced that after studying the intent of Congress in the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act it would enforce a total ban on South African uranium.

49. For a detailed response to congressional questions on the Reagan

administration's follow-up to these recommendations, see Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Testimony to the House Africa Subcommittee, 16 June 1987. Also see Senator Paul Simon, "The Senate's New African Agenda," *Africa Report*, May/June 1987.

50. For details of this UN struggle, see Margaret A. Novicki, "Southern Africa: Behind the Scenes at the UN," *Africa Report*, May–June 1987, 7. The Reagan administration again vetoed UN sanctions—this time over the issue of Namibia—on 9 Apr. 1987. See "UN Vote on Sanctions for Pretoria Defeated," *New York Times*, 10 Apr. 1987, p. 7.

51. For a brief overview of the ANC's early years see Stephen M. Davis, *Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987). For greater detail on the pre–World War II period see Edward Roux, *Time Longer Than Rope: The Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1948). For the postwar period see Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945* (London and New York: Longman, 1983). For the ANC's official position on various issues see their monthly magazine *Sechaba*, available from the ANC's UN Observer Mission office at 801 Second Ave., Suite 405, New York, NY 10017.

52. Quoted in Glenn Frankel, "S. African Rebels Make Comeback," *Washington Post*, 1 Jan. 1984, p. A20.

53. Thomas G. Karis, "South African Liberation: The Communist Factor," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1986/1987.

54. See Danaher, *Political Economy*, chapter 2; and Martin Murray, *South African Capitalism and Black Political Opposition* (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1982).

55. David Hirschman, "Changing Attitudes of Black South Africans Toward the United States," Rhodes University, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Working Paper no. 34 (Jan. 1987).

56. For a more complete history see Danaher, *Political Economy*.

57. For works displaying this trait of strong empiricism with little or no theorizing, see Anthony Lake, "Caution and Concern: The Making of American Policy Toward South Africa, 1946–1971" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1974); John Seiler, "The Formulation of U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, 1957–1976: The Failure of Good Intentions" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1976).

58. This conceptual weakness is common in the literature on economic development as well. Modernization theory examines nations as separate units that advance, as nations, through a ladder of stages which are progressive. This view fails to locate development within the context of an ever-changing world economy in which transnational alliances of class factions, institutions, and individuals play an important role.

59. For details on these conservative black groups see Nicholas Haysom, *Apartheid's Private Army: The Rise of Right-Wing Vigilantes in South Africa* (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986).

60. "South Africa: Jet-trekkers," *The Economist*, 11 July 1987, 41. The liberalizing impact of these meetings is partly offset by the fact that the whites who are emigrating from South Africa in growing numbers tend to be liberals rather than conservatives.

61. "South Africa: Jet-trekkers."

62. Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa: The Afrikaner Angst," *Foreign Policy*, no. 69 (Winter 1987-88).

63. See U.S. General Accounting Office, *Terrorism: Laws Cited Imposing Sanctions on Nations Supporting Terrorism* GAO/NSIAD-87-133FS, Apr. 1987. Also see Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1985), 744-753, for details on U.S. sanctions against Zimbabwe and Grenada.

64. Judith Miller, "When Sanctions Worked," *Foreign Policy*, no. 39 (Summer 1980), 125.

65. For details see U.S. Department of State, "AID in South Africa: Making a Difference," in the South Africa section of AID's *Fiscal Year 1988 Congressional Presentation, Africa Volume*, Jan. 1987; and U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Assistance: Working for Positive Change in South Africa*, Sept. 1986.

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67. Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1976), 105.

68. For a detailed critique of such rationales as the progressive impact of U.S. investment, the strategic importance of the Cape Sea Route, the need for strategic minerals, and others, see Danaher, *In Whose Interest*.

69. U.S. Department of State, *A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa: The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa*, Jan. 1987, 34.

70. U.S. Dept. of State, *A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa*, 4.

71. For a bibliographic essay detailing three basic U.S. policy options toward South Africa, see Kevin Danaher, "U.S. Policy Options Toward South Africa," *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs* 13, no. 1 (1980-81).

72. See Kevin Danaher, "South Africa: Hunger in a Land of Plenty," *Action Alert*, 1986.

73. Lipton, *Sanctions and South Africa*, 32. Also see "Sanctions and the South African Economy," Overseas Development Institute Briefing Paper, December 1986, 1.

74. November 1987 interview with U.S. Commerce Department official. The *Wall Street Journal* of 21 Sept. 1987 reported that sanctions are inhibiting economic growth. "A State Department economist calculates that the economy would have grown about one percentage point faster in the absence of sanctions, making it more difficult for South Africa to reach the 5% to 6% annual growth rate needed to keep up with population growth and to cut unemployment."

75. Legislation proposed in 1987 by California Democrats Rep. Ronald Dellums and Sen. Alan Cranston would extend U.S. economic sanctions by prohibiting all trade and investment, and banning U.S. banks from holding accounts of the South African government, among other measures. See House Resolution 1580, 100th Congress, 1st Session, introduced 12 March 1987.

76. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Sec.3(B), bans bank loans but the definition does not include "(i) normal short-term trade financing, as by letters of credit or similar trade credits; (ii) sales on open account in cases where such sales are normal business practice; or (iii) rescheduling of existing loans, if no new funds or credits are thereby extended to a South African entity or the Government of South Africa."

77. Pamela Freer, *South Africa to 1990: Growing to Survive*, (London:

Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986), 67. In a report entitled "Economic Effects of Sanctions on Southern Africa," J. P. Hayes of London's Trade Policy Research Centre notes that "the virtual cessation of capital inflows" from Western banks, companies, and governments has been the most damaging measure to the South African economy. "Pretoria exports face new threat," *Financial Times*, 30 Apr. 1987.

78. See Jane Hunter, *Undercutting Sanctions: Israel, the U.S. and South Africa* (Washington, DC: Washington Middle East Associates, 1986).

79. See U.S. Department of State, "Report to the Congress on Industrialized Democracies' Relations with and Measures Against South Africa," 12 May 1987, In Implementation of Sections 401(b)(2)(B) and 506(a) of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.

80. For a useful discussion of this phenomenon in other countries, see Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in a Divided Society* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1980).

81. *Resister*, no. 52 (Oct./Nov. 1987), 2.

82. Quoted in Michael J. Smith and Stanley Hoffman, "...No, Instead Divest," *New York Times*, 24 June 1983.

83. *Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1986), 140.

84. *Ibid.*

85. Murphy Morobe, publicity officer of the now banned United Democratic Front, has said, "The state is trying to move us from an area [nonviolent mass resistance] where we have been able to strike significant blows against apartheid and move us to a sphere where it believes it is stronger—the area of violence." But the UDF refuses to be provoked: "Our strength as the UDF lies on the basis that we conduct our struggle non-violently." Anton Harber, "The Voice from Underground," *The Weekly Mail*, 12–18 June 1987.

86. For details on South Africa's many-sided war against its neighbors see Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*.

87. See Thandika Mkandawire, "Dependence and Economic Cooperation: The Case of SADCC," in Emmanuel Hansen, ed., *Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development* (London and New Jersey: United Nations Univ./Zed Books Ltd., 1987); and Reginald H. Green and Carol B.

Thompson, "Political Economies in Conflict: SADCC, South Africa and Sanctions," in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, eds., *Destructive Engagement* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986).

88. Frances Moore Lappé, Rachel Schurman and Kevin Danaher, *Betraying the National Interest* (New York and San Francisco: Grove Press/Food First Books, 1987).

89. We make these proposals with full knowledge that they imply a veritable revolution in U.S. foreign assistance. Only an informed and active citizens' movement could ensure that U.S. aid would not slip into its traditional path of seeking to control recipient countries.

90. David Wiley, "Perspectives on U.S. Educational Assistance to South Africans and Namibians," *ACAS Bulletin* (Association of Concerned Africa Scholars), no. 20 (Summer 1987), 7.

91. See "Prop for U.S. Policy: Secret Saudi Funds," *New York Times*, 21 June 1987, p. 1. In testimony to Congress, businessman Sam Bamieh, a U.S. resident, confessed that he had acted as a conduit for Saudi government funds to Savimbi's UNITA.

92. See Neil A. Lewis, "Pretoria Sanctions Don't Work, Reagan Report to Congress Says," *New York Times*, 1 Oct. 1987, p. 1. Congress intended the act to ban imports of South African iron and steel but the Reagan administration exempted certain alloys. The administration also tried, unsuccessfully, to open a large loophole in the law's ban on the importation of South African uranium. See General Accounting Office, *South Africa: Status Report on Implementation of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act*, GAO/NSIAD-88-44, Oct. 1987.

93. John E. Rielly, "America's State of Mind," *Foreign Policy*, no. 66 (Spring), 1987, 50.

94. *Ibid.*

95. *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1987* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), 20.

96. See *Betraying the National Interest*.

97. See "From Divestment to Reinvestment: Baltimore campaign links apartheid, red-lining," *Dollars and Sense*, June 1987.

98. "Alumni Urge Harvard to Divest," *Mother Jones*, May 1987, 12.

99. *From Appeal For Action Against Apartheid* (New York: United Nations

Centre Against Apartheid, no date).

100. For an outline of how this could be accomplished with diamonds—another major export—as well as gold, see “Go for gold,” *The Economist*, 19 July 1986, 11–12.

101. U.S. General Accounting Office, *International Trade: Libya Trade Sanctions*, GAO/NSIAD-87-132BR, May 1987.

102. “Business Barometer,” *The Weekly Mail*, 18–23 Dec. 1987, 22.

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